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Abstract:  This paper examines the relationship between mergers and acquisitions, efficiency,
and scale economies in the US life insurance industry. We estimate cost and revenue efficiency
over the period 1988-1995 using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The Malmquist
methodology is used to measure changes in efficiency over time. We find that acquired firms
achieve greater efficiency gains than firms that have not been involved in mergers or
acquisitions. Firms operating with non-decreasing returns to scale and financially vulnerable
firms are more likely to be acquisition targets. Overall, mergers and acquisitions in the life
insurance industry have had a beneficial effect on efficiency.
Journal of Economic Literature  classification codes: G2, G22, G34. L11.
Key Words: Efficiency, life insurance, mergers and acquisitions, scale economies, data
envelopment analysis.2
The Glass-Steagall Act prevents banks from entering the insurance business as underwriters, but
1
banks can sell annuity and insurance products manufactured by an unaffiliated insurance company.
Discussions of consolidation in the financial press also invariably mention scale economies and
2
efficiency gains as motivating factors in insurer mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Lonkevich, 1995).
We also present a brief analysis of acquiring firms. We place less emphasis on acquiring firms
3
because a significant number of acquirers are not insurance companies and hence do not appear in our data
base.
During the past decade, the U.S. life insurance industry has experienced an unprecedented wave of
mergers and acquisitions.  Traditionally, the industry has been known for its high-cost distribution system
and lack of price competition, but insurers are increasingly faced with more intensive competition from
non-traditional sources such as banks, mutual funds, and investment advisory firms.  These non-traditional
competitors have captured a major share of the market for asset accumulation products such as annuities
and cash value life insurance.    The increased competition has narrowed profit margins and motivated
1
insurers to seek ways to reduce costs.  The more stringent solvency standards implemented under the risk-
based capital system adopted in 1993 also have put pressure on insurers to strengthen their financial
statements. Technological advances in sales, pricing, underwriting, and policyholder services have forced
insurers to become more innovative; and the relatively high fixed costs of the new systems may have
affected the minimum efficient scale in the industry.  
These developments suggest that scale economies and potential efficiency gains may provide a
major motivation for the recent mergers and acquisitions in the insurance industry.  Indeed, insurers often
cite efficiency and scale economies in justifying mergers and acquisitions to regulators.   Thus, an important
2
issue in insurance industry consolidation is whether mergers and acquisitions actually succeed in improving
efficiency.  We investigate this issue by measuring several types of efficiency in the U.S. life insurance
industry over the period 1988-1995, using data envelopment analysis (DEA).  Malmquist indices are used
to measure changes in efficiency and productivity over time. Our analysis focuses primarily on acquisition
targets: We compare the efficiency of targets of mergers and acquisitions with firms that have not been
targets of consolidation activity.   
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In spite of the magnitude and importance of the consolidation trend in the life insurance industry,
ours is the first paper to investigate the effects of life insurer mergers and acquisitions on efficiency. There
have been several prior papers on the efficiency of U.S. life insurers, mostly focusing on scale economies
(e.g., Grace and Timme, 1992, Yuengert, 1993, Gardner and Grace, 1993, and Cummins and Zi, 1998). 
These studies tend to find evidence of significant scale economies in the industry, although larger firms
generally are found to exhibit decreasing returns to scale.  There have been only a few prior papers on
mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. insurance industry (BarNiv and Hathorn, 1997; Chamberlain and
Tennyson, 1997; Meador, Madden and Johnston, 1986).  These papers  examine mergers in the property-
liability insurance industry and do not consider efficiency effects.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses various motivations for mergers and
acquisitions, and specifies the hypotheses to be investigated in this paper.  Section 3 presents an empirical
overview of concentration trends in the life insurance industry.  Section 4 discusses our procedures for
identifying life insurance acquisitions and presents summary statistics on mergers and acquisitions in the
industry.  Our data base and methodology for the efficiency analysis are discussed in section 5.  Section 6
presents our estimates of efficiency and scale economies, and section 7 concludes.
2.  Hypothesis Formulation
Mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by opportunities to improve firm operating
performance; in such circumstances a merger or acquisition may be expected to enhance the efficiency of
the target firm and/or the combined post-merger entity.  In this paper, we investigate both cost and revenue
efficiency.  Cost efficiency for a given firm is defined as the ratio of the costs of a fully efficient firm with
the same output quantities and input prices (i.e., a firm operating on the efficient cost frontier) to the given
firm’s actual costs.  Cost efficiency varies between zero and 1, with fully efficient firms having cost
efficiency equal to 1.  Firms achieve cost efficiency by adopting the best practice technology (becoming
technologically efficient) and by adopting the cost-minimizing mix of inputs (becoming allocatively
efficient).  Revenue efficiency is defined as the ratio of a given firm’s revenues to the revenues of a fully4
efficient firm with the same input quantities and output prices.  Fully efficient firms have revenue efficiency
equal to 1 while inefficient firms have revenue efficiency less than 1.  Revenue efficiency is attained by
using the best practice technology and choosing the optimal mix of outputs. 
There are a number of reasons to believe that mergers and acquisitions can permit insurance firms
to operate more efficiently.  If the managers of acquiring firms are more capable than those of acquirers
then one would expect to observe cost or revenue efficiency gains, or both, following a merger or
acquisition.  In addition, even relatively efficient firms may experience efficiency gains from affiliating with
others.  The predominant organizational model in the insurance industry is the insurance group, consisting
of several insurers under common ownership.  Although members of groups often operate independently in
terms of marketing, a number of important operations such as information systems, investments, and
policyholder services usually are conducted centrally.  Spreading the fixed costs of these operations over a
broader base has the potential to improve cost efficiency.  Revenue efficiency may be improved as well if
consolidation facilitates cross-selling, improves customer satisfaction, and otherwise enhances the firm’s
ability to produce revenues.  Accordingly, we hypothesize that the efficiency of target firms will tend to
increase following an acquisition.
Another rationale for mergers and acquisitions –  earnings diversification – may provide a
particularly strong motivation for mergers in the insurance industry.  By increasing the breadth of the
policyholder pool, losses become more predictable and earnings volatility due to underwriting income is
reduced.  This gives the insurer the opportunity to take on more risky, higher yielding investments, thus
increasing revenues for a given level of overall risk.  This provides another rationale for the hypothesis that
acquired firms should show greater revenue efficiency gains than non-M&A firms.   
Opportunities for post-merger performance improvements may be greater in firms that are
currently relatively inefficient, and thus M&A activity may involve relatively efficient insurers taking over
and reforming inefficient firms.  This reasoning would imply that life insurance targets should exhibit lower
efficiency prior to their acquisition, and/or that less efficient firms should be more likely to be acquired.  On5
Although not analyzed here, similar reasoning suggests acquiring firms should tend to display either
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increasing or constant returns to scale.  An acquisition offers the opportunity for a firm with increasing
returns to scale to attain constant returns to scale more quickly than by normal sales growth.  A firm that is
already too large (operating with decreasing returns to scale) would not seem to have much to gain from
acquisitions, at least from a cost perspective.  
the other hand, during our sample period, the life insurance market was undergoing significant changes that
offered opportunities for aggressive insurers to gain market share, potentially both reducing costs and
enhancing revenues.  The changes in marketing systems and technology have been especially dramatic
(Carr, 1997).  In this type of environment, firms that possess leading-edge competencies in the areas most
subject to change may be viewed as attractive acquisition targets.  Thus, we do not have a strong prediction
with regard to whether acquisition targets are likely to be relatively inefficient or relatively efficient.
The quest for scale economies is often given as the rationale for mergers and acquisitions.  Under
this motive, firms operating with non-decreasing (constant or increasing) returns to scale will be attractive
acquisition targets because they are currently operating in the optimal size range or have the opportunity to
become more efficient through growth.  Firms operating with decreasing returns to scale are likely to be
viewed as unattractive acquisition targets because they are already “too large” in terms of scale economies.  
Another objective frequently given for mergers and acquisitions is to increase market share in a firm’s core
lines of business or to diversify into new product markets or geographical regions.  Under this objective as
well, firms characterized by non-decreasing returns to scale would seem to be more attractive as merger or
acquisition partners because future growth is less likely to lead to scale diseconomies.  Thus, we
hypothesize that acquisition targets are more likely than firms not engaging in  merger or acquisition activity
(non-M&A firms) to be characterized by non-decreasing returns to scale.  
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We also hypothesize that unaffiliated single companies are less likely to be acquired than members
of insurance groups, due to managerial self interest.  The managers of an unaffiliated company face an
uncertain future if their firm is acquired by another firm and, as a result, are likely to be resistant to
takeover offers.  Managers of insurance groups, on the other hand, are more likely to view the purchase and6
The risk-based capital ratio is the ratio of an insurer’s equity capital to its risk-based capital, which
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is determined by the characteristics of the insurer’s asset and liability portfolios.  Insurers with risk-based
capital ratios below 200 percent receive additional regulatory scrutiny.  Regulators are required to take
control of companies with risk-based capital ratios below 70 percent.
sale of companies as important components of their strategic arsenal and as potentially enhancing rather
than threatening their personal economic value.  Although group managers do have to confront the risk that
a purchase or sale may turn out to be unprofitable, this risk to their job security is likely to be much less
than the threat that a buy-out poses to managers of an unaffiliated firm.
Insurer mergers and acquisitions also may be motivated by regulatory considerations.  Insurers are
regulated at the state level, with coordination provided by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC).  In response to a sharp increase in insolvencies during the 1980s, the NAIC
adopted a risk-based capital (RBC) system in 1993 designed to raise capital standards in the industry.  
Although many insurers restructured their asset portfolios and made other changes to improve their
risk-based capital ratios, the weaker insurers in the industry still face the prospect of having to raise
additional equity capital to avoid incurring significant regulatory costs.   Raising capital is problematical for
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many insurers because the industry contains many mutuals and closely held stock companies, organizational
forms that are limited in their ability to raise new capital.  Moreover, information asymmetries with respect
to the quality of the insurer’s assets and the accuracy of its reserve estimates may raise the costs of external
capital and thus make raising new capital unattractive to many insurers (Chamberlain and Tennyson, 1997). 
If information asymmetries between acquiring firms and targets are less than between target insurers and
the capital markets, insurers that face regulatory costs and capital constraints are likely to be attractive
acquisition targets for stronger firms, particularly if they are efficient and/or operating with favorable
returns to scale. Thus, we hypothesize that target firms are likely to display one or more signs of financial
vulnerability.
3. Life Insurance Industry Structure
This section provides a brief statistical overview of the structure of the life insurance industry  to7
provide the backdrop for the merger analysis. Consolidation in insurance has taken a different form from
that occurring in banking.  While consolidation in banking has resulted in the removal of thousands of
banks from the market (Amel, 1996), the number of insurers has remained relatively constant.  The reason
for the difference is that branching and interstate banking restrictions prevented many banks from
expanding outside their local areas, whereas the insurance industry has not faced such restrictions. Thus,
the insurance market has had greater opportunity to converge to an efficient equilibrium with regard to the
number and geographical scope of firms, resulting in a market dominated by firms that operate nationally
or regionally.
The numbers of insurers with meaningful data reporting to the NAIC during the period 1988
through 1995 are shown in Table 1.  During our sample period the number of companies with a group
affiliation remained relatively constant at about 900 (groups control more than 90 percent of industry
assets).   The number of unaffiliated single companies declined by about 10 percent over the period, from
334 to 303.  The relative constancy in the number of firms during an era when the industry is undergoing
significant restructuring is due to the fact that many transactions involve groups buying and selling
companies that remain in existence after the transaction.  Another factor is that the numbers of firms exiting
the market due to merger or insolvency have been partially offset by the formation of new insurers. 
Consequently, the restructuring of the life insurance industry primarily tends to involve such strategic
objectives as an increased emphasis on core competencies or the expansion into new markets rather than
the consolidation of geographically concentrated firms as in banking (Carr, 1997).
There are five major lines of business in the life insurance industry – individual life, individual
annuities, group life, group annuities, and accident and health.  The most important lines of business in
terms of both revenues and profits are those involving asset accumulation products, i.e., individual life and
individual and group annuities.  Individual life insurance accounted for 24.6 percent of premium revenues
in 1995, whereas individual and group annuities accounted for 21.6 and 23.6 percent, respectively.   Group
life and accident and health insurance, which are mainly indemnity rather than asset accumulation products,8
account for the remaining 30.2 percent of revenues.  The importance of  asset accumulation products is
particularly noteworthy because this is the market where insurers face the most vigorous competition from
banks, mutual fund companies, and investment advisory firms.  Because these non-traditional competitors
have much lower distribution costs than insurers, insurers face intense pressure to operate more efficiently
in order to remain competitive in the asset accumulation market.
Concentration trends in the industry are shown in Figure 1, which presents the Herfindahl indices
by line of business over the sample period, based on premium volume.  The indices are calculated by
decision making unit, i.e., the market share proportions used to construct the indices are for groups and
unaffiliated single companies.   Consistent with the view that restructuring in the insurance industry
primarily involves strategic realignment rather than changes in concentration, the Herfindahl indices are
relatively constant over the sample period for the industry as a whole and for all lines except group life and
group annuities.  Concentration in group life insurance increased significantly over the sample period,
consistent with a drive for scale economies.  Group life insurance is a highly competitive market with
knowledgeable, cost conscious buyers (business firms), many of whom have the alternative of self insuring. 
Group life insurers thus compete in terms of the efficiency with which they can administer  programs for
the buyers, resulting in very low expense ratios and profit margins.  Being able to spread the fixed costs of
operating in the group life insurance business over a broader customer base thus is likely to be a major
competitive advantage in this market.  In the group annuity market, on the other hand, concentration
decreased significantly over the sample period as non-traditional competitors captured market share from
the large insurers that traditionally dominated this market.  
Four, eight, and twenty-firm concentration ratios for industry assets and premiums are presented in
Table 2.  The four-firm concentration ratios for assets declined significantly over the sample period,
reflecting a loss of market share by the  mega-insurers that traditionally have dominated the industry. 
Although there are undoubtedly a number of factors that have driven this decline, it is consistent with the
findings by Yuengert (1993) and Cummins and Zi (1998) that firms in this size class are characterized by9
decreasing returns to scale and thus likely to offer relatively unattractive  policyholder investment yields.
4. Sample Selection
Because there is no single authoritative source for information on mergers and acquisitions in the
insurance industry,  we consulted a number of different sources to estimate the number of such transactions
that occurred during our sample period.  The sources we utilized were Mergers and Acquisitions
magazine, which reports merger transactions across all industries; Best’s Review’s, which provides annual
summaries of all mergers, entries, and exits in the insurance industry; and Best’s Insurance Reports, which
reports the composition of life insurance groups.  We used this latter source to compile a list of all changes
in groups and group composition over our sample period; we then investigated each of these changes to
identify those arising from mergers and acquisitions.  Finally, we cross-checked our lists of transactions
against the list of mergers and acquisitions compiled by Conning and Company, an insurance industry
consulting firm.  The final list of transactions used in our study represents the union of the transactions
reported in the four sources, after screening to remove reported transactions that did not satisfy our sample
selection criteria, discussed below. 
To focus our study on transactions that involve a change in ownership of an insurance firm, we
include in our database only complete acquisitions and acquisitions of a majority interest that were
characterized by Best’s Insurance Reports as resulting in a change in control.  We excluded acquisitions of
a minority interest and acquisitions of lines of business from our set of transactions.  We also excluded all
transactions which represented the internal restructuring of an existing insurance group.  All potential
transactions identified from the above list of sources were then further investigated in the company
discussions in the relevant issues of Best’s Insurance Reports; those transactions which could not be
verified in this source were also excluded from our sample.
We initially identified 317 firms that were targets of mergers and acquisitions during the period10
The numbers of firms that were targets for mergers and acquisitions by year were 43, 57, 48, 51, 52,
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and 66, for the years 1989 through 1994, respectively.  This list of target firms does not include those that
were found to be internal restructurings of a group or acquisitions of foreign firms.  
Because insurers must obtain a license from each state in which they operate, the regulatory costs of
7
starting a new insurer or expanding into new states can be significant.  Accordingly, even insurers with no
assets or premiums are valuable for their licenses, creating a market in corporate insurance shells.  Because
the focus of the study is on the acquisition of viable operating entities, shell insurers were omitted from our
sample.
1989-1994.  The largest number of events involved the purchase of a single company by another company
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or by a group, where the acquired company continued to operate as a distinct entity after the acquisition. 
On average, about 25 such targets were involved in acquisitions in each year during the sample period
(1989-1994).  The number of merger targets we identified, i.e., cases where a company was absorbed by
another company, averaged about 7 per year.  The number of cases where an entire group is acquired,
usually by another group, averaged 8.5 per year.  A few companies were involved in more than one
transaction during the sample period, for example by being purchased by one group and then later sold to
another. 
Testing hypotheses regarding the cost and revenue efficiency of firms that were targets of mergers
and acquisitions necessitates imposing some further selection criteria.  This analysis requires a sample of
firms for which reported financial data are a meaningful representation of firm production activities and for
which we can isolate the effects of acquisition.  Accordingly, we omit from the sample any target firm that
was a shell company, in run-off or inactive prior to the acquisition.  In addition, we include only those
7
target firms for which there is a two year time horizon, both prior to and following their acquisition, in
which they are free of other mergers and acquisitions activity.  Activities that led to omission from the
sample on this criterion included mergers or acquisitions of other companies (affiliated or unaffiliated),
acquisitions of lines of business, a second acquisition of the target, or the acquisition of the target’s parent
company. Also excluded from the sample were firms that were merged, retired or put into run-off or
liquidation at acquisition or within two years thereafter.11
Of the 317 M&A targets identified from our examination of Mergers and Acquisitions, Best’s, and
8
the Conning and Company reports, 59 were eliminated from the sample because they were inactive
companies, shell companies, or in runoff when acquired; 68 were eliminated because they were merged or
retired within two years after the acquisition; 45 were eliminated because they were involved in one or more
additional M&A transactions within two years before or two years after the transaction; and 8 were
eliminated because the transaction could not be verified in Best’s Insurance Reports.
These sample selection criteria resulted in a sample size of 137 acquired firms for our primary
analysis, of which efficiency scores could be estimated for 106.   We were unable to estimate efficiencies
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for some firms because they do not appear in our data base for one or more years or because they exhibited
unusual values for some key variables, such as negative premiums or negative net worth.  These problems
are symptomatic of firms that are experiencing financial difficulties or firms that were placed in runoff or
liquidation but were not identified as such in our earlier screens.  We believe our thorough analysis of the
characteristics of the mergers and acquisitions in the insurance industry has resulted in a well-defined
sample consisting of nearly all acquired firms that continued to operate as viable decision making units
following the acquisition.
5.  Data and Methodology
This section briefly describes our data base and discusses the measurement of the inputs, outputs,
input prices, and output prices used in our analysis.  The section concludes with a discussion of the data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist methodologies used in our analysis.
The Data
The data used in our study are drawn from  the regulatory annual statements filed by insurers with
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  Because all insurers of any significant size
are required to report to the NAIC, our data base initially consisted of virtually the entire industry. We
eliminated firms with unusual characteristics such as zero or negative net worth, premiums, or inputs.  We
also eliminated firms with extreme or unusual financial ratios such as returns on equity greater or less than
100 percent because such firms are clearly experiencing financial difficulties.  The final sample used to
estimate efficiency consists of approximately 750 firms per year, representing about 80 percent of industry12
assets.  Because the Malmquist analysis requires that firms be present in each year of several overlapping
blocks of five contiguous years, the sample size in the Malmquist estimation is smaller, consisting of about
550 companies per five year block.  Output prices were also calculated using NAIC data, while data to
calculate input prices were obtained from governmental sources (see below).
Outputs and Inputs
This section briefly discusses several measurement issues in constructing the data set.  We first
describe the process for choosing the services to measure as outputs in life insurance and explain how we
measure outputs and output prices.  We next turn to a discussion of input quantities and the input prices. 
Outputs and Output Prices.  Consistent with most of the recent financial institutions literature, we
measure output using a modified version of the value-added approach, which counts as outputs activities
that have significant value added, as judged using operating cost allocations (see Berger and Humphrey
1992b). Life insurers provide three principal services:
! Financial Intermediation.  As discussed above, asset accumulation products account for about
70 percent of revenues in the industry.  Insurers issue insurance and annuity contracts and invest in
traded securities as well as assets that are not available to most investors, such as privately placed
bonds and structured securities.  Insurers’ principal source of value added is reflected in the net
interest margin between the rate of return earned on invested assets and the rate credited to
policyholders.  
! Risk-pooling and risk-bearing.  Insurance  provides a mechanism through which consumers
and businesses exposed to losses can engage in risk reduction through pooling. In life insurance the
principal risks are the risk of death (life insurance), the risk of longevity (annuities), and risk of loss
from accidents or illness (accident and health insurance).  The actuarial, underwriting, and related
expenses incurred in risk pooling are important components of value added in the industry. 
Insurers also add value by holding equity capital to bear the residual risk of the pool.
! "Real" financial services relating to insured losses.  Insurers provide a variety of real services
for policyholders including personal financial planning and the administration of group life, annuity,
and health insurance plans. By contracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders can
take advantage of insurers' specialized expertise in managing insurable risks.
We follow Yuengert (1993) in using incurred benefits plus additions to reserves to measure life13
In the past, researchers often used premiums as a measure of insurance output.  However, this is
9
incorrect, because premiums represent revenues, that is, price times quantity, rather than quantity (Yuengert,
1993).
Insurers are required to allocate investment income by line in their regulatory annual reports, and
10
we use the reported allocations in defining output prices.
insurance output.    Incurred benefits represent payments received by policyholders in the current year and
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are useful proxies for the risk-pooling and risk-bearing functions because they  measure the amount of
funds pooled by insurers and redistributed to policyholders as compensation for insured events. 
Most life insurance and annuity products involve the accumulation of assets, either to pay future
death benefits or to be received as income through an annuity.  The funds received by insurers that are not
needed for benefit payments and expenses are added to policyholder reserves, which are analogous to bank
deposits.  The funds backing the reserves are invested by insurers in financial instruments.  Additions to
reserve thus should be highly correlated with the intermediation output.  Both incurred benefits and
additions to reserves are correlated with real services provided by insurers, such as benefit administration in
the case of group insurance and financial planning in the case of retail products.  
Because the major lines of insurance differ in the types of contingent events that are covered and in
the relative importance of the risk-pooling, intermediation, and real service components of output, we
define five output variables, equal to the sum of incurred benefits and additions to reserves for the five
major lines of business offered by life insurers – individual life insurance, individual annuities, group life
insurance, group annuities, and accident and health insurance.  All outputs are expressed in real terms by
deflating to 1982 using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
In keeping with the value-added approach to output measurement, we define the price of each
insurance output as the sum of premiums and investment income minus output for the line divided by
output.   The approach is consistent with that used by Berger, et al. (1997) and other researchers. All
10
quantities are expressed in real terms by deflating by the CPI prior to calculating the output prices.  
Inputs and Input Prices.  Insurance inputs can be classified into four groups — home office labor,14
Some companies rely exclusively on agents to distribute their products, others have no agents and
11
market their products through the mail or using telemarketing, while still others use a combination of agents
and other distribution techniques.   
A potential problem with this approach is that larger insurers often maintain regional branch offices
12
that perform various administrative tasks. Consequently, as a robustness check, we also conducted the
analysis using two additional definitions of the price of home office labor — national average weekly wages
for SIC class 6311 and state weighted-average weekly wages, using as weights the proportion of an insurer’s
premium writings in each state.  The use of these alternative labor price variables did not materially affect the
results.
agent labor, business services (including physical capital), and financial capital.  We treat home office and
agent labor separately because the two types of labor have different prices and are used in different
proportions by firms in the industry.   We measure the price of home office labor using U.S. Department
11
of Labor data on average weekly wages for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Class 6311, life
insurance companies.  The wages for the state in which the company maintains its home office are used in
the analysis to proxy for the price of home office labor.   
12
The price of agent labor is measured using U.S. Department of Labor data on average weekly
wages for SIC class 6411, insurance agents.   A weighted average wage variable is used, with weights equal
to the proportion of an insurer’s premiums written in each state. The weighted average approach is more
appropriate for agent labor than for home office labor because agency services are provided at the local
level, whereas most of the other tasks performed by insurance company employees take place at the home
office or in regional offices.   The home office and agent wage variables are expressed in 1982 dollars by
deflating by the CPI. 
Labor is the most important non-interest expense for the insurance industry, accounting for about
two-thirds of total non-loss expenses.  The remaining insurer expenses are for real capital such as
computers and real estate and business services such as legal fees, travel, communications and advertising.
Expenditures for these items are aggregated together into our business services input. Including this input
allows the estimation to account for variations across insurers in expenditures on computers,
communications, and other technology-related items.  The price of business services is the average weekly15
As a robustness check, we also conducted the analysis using the insurers’ reported average return
13
on book equity over the three years prior to each sample year.  Using this alternative cost of capital measure
did not materially affect the results.  
wage in SIC sector 7300, business services, deflated to 1982 dollars using the CPI.
Data on the number of employees or hours worked in the insurance industry are not available. 
Accordingly, we follow other insurance efficiency researchers (e.g, Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997,
Cummins and Zi, 1998) in measuring the quantity of agent and home office labor by dividing real dollar
expenditures on these two expense categories by the agent and home office wage variables discussed
above.  The quantity of business services is defined similarly.
Our final input is financial capital.  Financial capital is an important input in insurance because
insurers must maintain equity capital to ensure policyholders that they will receive payment if claims exceed
expectations and to satisfy regulatory requirements.  Capital costs represent a significant expense for
insurers.  The financial capital input is defined as the amount of equity capital reported by the insurer to the
NAIC, deflated to 1982 dollars using the CPI.  
The cost of capital in the insurance industry is difficult to measure because only a small fraction of
life insurers are publicly traded.  We adopt a three-tier approach to measuring the cost of capital, based on
financial ratings assigned by the A.M. Best Company, the leading financial rating firm for insurers.  Best’s
uses a fifteen tier letter-coded rating system ranging from A++ for the strongest insurers to F for insurers in
liquidation.  The three tiers we adopt consist of the four ratings in the “A” range, the four ratings in the “B”
range, and all other rating categories.  Based on an examination of the equity cost of capital for traded life
insurers, we assign a cost of capital of 12 percent to the top tier, 15 percent for the middle tier, and 18
percent for insurers in the lowest quality-tier. 
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Estimation Methodology
We estimate efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric approach that
computes “best practice” efficient frontiers based on convex combinations of firms in the industry.  DEA16
Cummins and Zi (1998) find rank correlations or around 0.67  between the efficiency scores
14
produced by DEA and those obtained from econometric models.
has been used extensively in estimating efficiency for a wide variety of industries (see Charnes, et al., 1994,
and Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  We adopt DEA in this study for two major reasons: (1) It provides a
particularly convenient method for decomposing cost efficiency into its components — technical and
allocative efficiency – as well as for decomposing technical efficiency into pure technical and scale
efficiency.  And (2) the Malmquist approach, which is the standard technique for measuring the evolution
of productivity and efficiency over time, is DEA-based.  Thus, the use of DEA permits us to use the same
methodology consistently throughout the paper.
The alternative to DEA is the econometric approach.  The principal advantage of the econometric
approach is that it allows firms to deviate from the frontier due to purely random shocks as well as through
inefficiency, whereas DEA measures all deviations from the frontier as inefficiency.  The disadvantage of
the econometric approach is that it requires the specification of a cost or revenue function as well as (in
most variants) distributional assumptions about the error term, thus potentially confounding the efficiency
estimates with specification error.  We do not consider the lack of a random error component in DEA to be
a serious problem in studying the life insurance industry because a recent paper by Cummins and Zi (1998)
finds that econometric methods and DEA produce efficiency estimates for US life insurers that are highly
correlated and quite consistent.  They also find that DEA estimates of efficiency for life insurers are more
14
highly correlated with conventional performance measures than are the estimates obtained from the
econometric approach.  Based on the Cummins and Zi results, we consider DEA to be an appropriate
methodology for measuring efficiency in the life insurance industry.  
DEA Efficiency Estimation.  Detailed explanations of the DEA methodology are provided in Aly,
et al., 1990, Ali and Seiford, 1993, Charnes, et al., 1994, and other cited references.  Here we discuss the
technical efficiency optimization problem as an example of the approach and provide a brief intuitive
explanation of the other types of efficiency.D(x, y) ’ sup{ 2: ( x
2
, y) 0 V(y) }
’ ( inf{ 2: (2x , y) 0 V(y) } )&1
( D(xi, yi) )&1 ’ TE(xi, yi ) ’ min 2i
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          (1)
          (2)
DEA technical efficiency is measured by estimating “best practice” production frontiers, employing
the input distance function introduced by Shephard (1970).  Suppose producers use input vector x = ( x , 1
x ,... x  )  0 œ   to produce output vector y = ( y , y , ..y  )  0 œ .  A production technology which 2 k + 1 2 n +
k n
transforms inputs into outputs can be modeled by an input correspondence  y 6 V(y) f œ .  For any  y  0 +
k
œ , V(y) denotes the subset of all input vectors x  0  œ   which yield at least y (Färe, 1988).  The input + +
n k
oriented distance function D(x,y) is defined as follows:
The input distance function is the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional contraction of the input
vector x, given outputs y, i.e., Farrell's measure of input technical efficiency.   Input technical efficiency
TE(x,y) is therefore defined as TE(x,y) = 1/D(x,y).
Technical efficiency for each year is estimated separately for each firm in the sample by solving 
linear programming problems.  The linear programming problem for firm i is:
Subject to: Y 8 $ Y , X 8 # 2 X , and 8 $ 0 i i i i i i
where X is a K x I input matrix and Y an N x I output matrix for all sample firms, X is a K x 1 input vector i
and Y an N x 1 output vector of firm i, 8 is an I x 1 intensity vector (the inequalities are interpreted as i i
applying to each row of the relevant matrix), and i = 1, 2, . . ., I.  This estimation produces a constant
returns to scale (CRS) frontier.  Variable returns to scale (VRS) and non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS)
frontiers can also be estimated by changing the constraint on the 8 (Aly, et al., 1990). i
DEA cost efficiency is also estimated by solving linear programming problems.  In this case, the
problem is to choose input quantities to minimize costs holding constant input prices and output quantities. 18
The solution for firm i is the cost minimizing input vector X*.  Cost efficiency for firm i is then calculated i
as the ratio 0 = w X*/w X , where w  is the transpose of firm i’s input price vector, and X is its actual i i i i i  i i
T T T
input quantity vector.  Thus, cost efficiency 0 is the ratio of frontier costs for insurer i’s output vector and i
input prices to its actual costs, where 0 # 0 # 1, and  0 = 1 for fully efficient firms.  i i
Cost efficiency is the product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, i.e., firms can have
higher costs than represented by the frontier because they are not using the most efficient technology
(technical inefficiency) and/or because they are not using the cost minimizing input mix (allocative
inefficiency). Having cost and technical efficiency enables us to back out estimates of allocative efficiency
using the relationship: CE = TE*AE, where CE = cost efficiency, TE = technical efficiency, and AE =
allocative efficiency. Both technical and allocative efficiency are bounded by 0 and 1, with fully efficient
firms having efficiencies equal to 1.  
Technical efficiency can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency
(SE), where TE = PTE*SE, by solving additional linear programming problems. Pure technical efficiency is
measured relative to a variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier, which may have segments where best
practice firms operate with increasing returns to scale (IRS), constant returns to scale (CRS), and/or
decreasing returns to scale (DRS).  Pure technical efficiency is the reciprocal of the distance of firm i from
the VRS frontier.  Thus, the firm could achieve pure technical efficiency by moving to the VRS frontier.  If
the firm is operating in an IRS or DRS region of the frontier, it could further improve its efficiency by
attaining CRS. Both pure technical and scale efficiency are bounded by 0 and 1.  Firms with pure technical
efficiency equal to 1 are operating on the VRS frontier, and a scale efficiency score equal to 1 indicates that
a firm is operating with CRS.  The methodology also reveals whether a non-CRS firm is operating with IRS
or DRS (Aly, et al., 1990).
The final type of efficiency estimated in this study is revenue efficiency, also estimated by linear
programming.  The problem in this case is to choose output quantities to maximize revenues, taking as
given input quantities and output prices (see Lovell, 1993).  The solution for firm i is the revenue19
maximizing output vector Y , and revenue efficiency is defined as the ratio 6 = p Y/p Y*, where p  = i i i i i i   i
* T T T
the transpose of the output price vector for firm i and Y = the vector of actual output quantities for firm i.  i
Revenue efficiency 6 also satisfies the inequality, 0 # 6 # 1, with a score of 1 indicating that the firm is i i
fully revenue efficient. 
Malmquist Analysis.  We utilize the Malmquist index approach to analyze changes in efficiency
and productivity over time.  If technology is changing over time, we will observe shifts in the best practice
technical frontier.  Malmquist analysis permits us to separate shifts in the frontier (technical change) from
improvements in efficiency relative to the frontier (technical efficiency change).  The product of technical
change and technical efficiency change, total factor productivity change, is measured by the Malmquist
index (see Grosskopf, 1993).  
To illustrate the Malmquist concept, consider the single-input, single-output case represented in
Figure 2.  The line labeled 0V in the figure represents the production frontier in period t, whereas 0V
t t+1
represents the frontier in period t+1.  The improved technology represented by 0V  enables efficient firms
t+1
to produce the output using less of the input than was required by technology 0V .  Suppose that our
t 
hypothetical firm has input-output combination (x ,y ) in period t and (x ,y ) in period t+1.  Two i i i i
t t t+1 t+1
changes have occurred between period t and period t+1.  First, because of technical progress, the firm
produces more output per unit of input in period t+1 than in period t.  In fact,  its input-output combination
in period t+1 would have been infeasible using period t technology.  Thus, technical change has taken
place.  Second, the firm has also experienced technical efficiency change because its operating point is
closer to the frontier in t+1 than it was in period t. 
Malmquist analysis also is based on distance functions.  To define the Malmquist index, we modify
the distance function notation to incorporate time and define distance functions with respect to two
different time periods as D (x ,y ) and D(x ,y ), where D (D ) represents the distance function
t+1 t t t t+1 t+1 t  t+1
i i i i
relative to the frontier at time t (t+1), and x and y (x  and y ) are the input and output vectors at time t
t t t+1 t+1M t ’ D t(x t, y t)
D t(x t%1, y t%1)
or M t%1 ’ D t%1(x t, y t)
D t%1(x t%1, y t%1)
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(2)
(t+1). The function D (x ,y ) evaluates the input-output bundle in time period t relative to the technology
t+1 t t
i i
of time period t+1; while the function D(x ,y ) evaluates the input-output bundle observed in period t+1
t t+1 t+1
i i
relative to the technology of time t. The distance functions for a given year’s input-output vector relative to
the frontier for the same year are similarly denoted D(x ,y ) and D (x ,y ), for years t and t+1,
t t t t+1 t+1 t+1
i i i i
respectively.  In Figure 2, D (x ,y ) = 0a/0c, D(x ,y )  = 0e/0d, D(x ,y ) = 0a/0b, and D (x ,y ) =
t+1 t t t t+1 t+1 t t t t+1 t+1 t+1
i i i i i i i i
0e/0f. Notice that cross-frontier distance function estimates can be less than 1, whereas distance function
estimates for a given year’s input-output bundle relative to the frontier for the same year must be $ 1.  E.g.,
a distance function value less than one for D(x ,y ) implies that the specified input-output combination
t t+1 t+1
i i
is infeasible using the technology of period t.
Malmquist indices can be defined relative to either the technology in period t or the technology in
period t+1, as follows:
where M measures productivity growth between periods t and t+1 using the technology in period t as the
t
reference technology, and M  uses the technology in period t+1 as the reference technology. To avoid an
t+1
arbitrary choice of reference technology, the Malmquist index of total factor productivity is defined as the
geometric mean of M and M : M  = [M M ] . In Figure 2, the total factor productivity index is equal
t t+1 t+1 t  t+1 0.5
t
to [{(0a/0b)/(0e/0d)][(0a/0c)/(0e/0f)}]  .  A Malmquist index greater than 1 implies that total factor
½
productivity progress has occurred, while an index less than 1 implies technical regress.  The Malmquist
productivity index can be decomposed into measures of technical efficiency change and technical change
with values greater than 1 again indicating improvements.
In our analysis, we are interested in the change in efficiency for firms that are acquisition targets 
between the period prior to the acquisition and the period after the acquisition.  The year immediately prior
to the acquisition year and the year immediately afterwards may be unrepresentative of the past and future21
efficiency of the acquisition target.  To filter out any abnormal activities associated with the acquisition, we
measure technical efficiency change and technical change between the year two years prior to acquisition (t-
2) and the year two years after acquisition (t+2).  The analysis thus involves a sequence of overlapping five-
year blocks of data centered on the acquisition years 1990 through 1993.
6.  Estimation Results
This section presents the results of our analysis of the relationship between mergers and
acquisitions and efficiency in the life insurance industry.  We focus primarily on firms that were acquired
during the period 1990-1993 that continued to operate for at least two years following the acquisition. 
Focusing on target firms that continue to operate provides a relatively homogeneous sample consisting of
the most common type of M&A transaction among life insurers. 
We first present summary statistics on the characteristics of the firms in the sample and the results of
the DEA and Malmquist analyses.  We next conduct a regression analysis where the dependent variables
represent changes in various types of efficiency over a period ranging from two years prior to the year of
acquistion to two years after the year of acquisition. This analysis is designed to test for changes in efficiency
while controlling for characteristics of target and non-M&A firms that are hypothesized to be related to
efficiency changes.  The objective of the regression analysis is to investigate the principal issue addressed in
this paper, i.e., whether acquisitions lead to improvements in efficiency.  To test several of the hypotheses
discussed in section 2, we also conduct a probit analysis where the dependent variable is set equal to 1 for
target firms and to 0 for firms with no M&A activity. This analysis is intended to identify the predictor
variables characterizing target firms.  The section concludes with a brief analysis of the efficiency of acquiring
firms.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics (see Table 3) show several statistically significant differences between the
target and non-M&A firms.  Consistent with our hypothesis that firms characterized by non-decreasing
returns to scale (NDRS) are more attractive as acquisition targets, the proportion of target firms operating22
We also analyzed the data using a benchmarking approach, which consisted of matching each target
15
firm with ten firms from the non-M&A sample that were similar to the target firm in terms of size. 
Differences between the mean efficiencies and efficiency changes of the target and non-M&A benchmark
samples generally were not statistically significant. We conclude from this result that the benchmarking
approach does not adequately control for differences among firms, emphasizing the importance of conducting
our multiple regression analysis.
Because mutuals are owned by their policyholders and do not issue stock, mutual acquisitions are
16
usually accomplished using surplus notes, which are debt instruments subordinated to the insurance liabilities
of the company but treated as equity for regulatory purposes. 
with NDRS (73.3%) is significantly higher than for non-M&A firms (60.3%); and targets  on average have
significantly higher scale efficiencies than non-targets (93% versus 89%).  Target firms also have significantly
higher technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency than non-M&A firms, suggesting that insurance
acquisitions generally do not involve acquirers buying and reforming inefficient firms. The Malmquist indices
show that target firms experienced significantly larger gains in technical efficiency and in total factor
productivity over the sample period than did the non-M&A firms, consistent with the argument that
acquisitions lead to efficiency gains.   
15
Consistent with  our hypothesis that acquisition targets may display signs of financial vulnerability,
target firms have significantly lower ratios of operating cash flow to assets and are significantly less likely to
be rated A+ by the A.M. Best Company.  As expected, target firms are also less likely to be mutuals.   Target
16
companies are significantly less likely to be unaffiliated single firms, supporting the argument that managers
of unaffiliated companies are likely to resist takeovers.  Finally, target companies are somewhat smaller in
terms of assets than non-M&A firms and are significantly less concentrated geographically, suggesting that
acquiring firms prefer geographically diversified targets. 
Regression Analysis of Efficiency Changes
To analyze efficiency changes while controlling for other differences between target firms and the
non-M&A firms, we estimate regressions with efficiency changes as dependent variables
 and firm characteristics as independent variables.  The Malmquist analysis provides estimates of technical
efficiency change, technical change, and total factor productivity change; and these three indices are used23
separately as dependent variables. We also conduct regressions where the dependent variable is the ratio
KE(t+2)/KE(t-2), where KE stands for efficiency of type K and K = C, A, T, PT, S, and R representing,
respectively, cost, allocative, technical, pure technical, scale, and revenue efficiency.  The efficiency change
ratios compare a firm’s position relative to the frontier for period t+2 to its position relative to the frontier for
period t-2.  
Our analysis of efficiency changes relative to frontiers estimated for two different time periods is
consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997) and is appropriate because
movements in the frontier are caused primarily by improvements in technology and other factors that are not
related to mergers and need to be controlled for to isolate the merger effects. The comparison measures
whether the firm has moved closer to or further from the frontier over the period of comparison and is similar
to the efficiency change component of the Malmquist index, which also compares the firm to two separate
frontiers. By including both targets and non-targets in the regression, we control for  potential biases resulting
from shifts in the distribution of efficiency scores between periods t-2 and t+2.
The independent variables include size (log of assets), organizational form (a dummy variable
equal to 1 for mutuals and zero for stocks), ownership type (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an
unaffiliated company and zero otherwise), and business mix (the proportions of the firm’s premiums in
group life, group annuities, individual annuities, and accident and health insurance, with individual life
insurance as the excluded category).  To control for geographical concentration, we include the firm’s
geographical Herfindahl index, based on the proportions of premium revenues by state.  A firm with a high
geographical Herfindahl index has a substantial share of its business concentrated in one or a few states,
while firms with lower Herfindahl indices tend to be more geographically diversified.  To determine
whether acquisitions improve firm efficiency, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was
acquired during the period and zero otherwise. 
As explained above, the sample period for the regressions is 1990 through 1993 to permit us to
measure the change in efficiency over a period beginning two years prior to the acquisition year (t-2) and24
Our analysis of efficiency changes differs somewhat from that in Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey
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(1997) in that our dependent variable is the ratio of efficiency after the transaction to efficiency prior to the
ending two years after the acquisition year (t+2). Thus, efficiency changes are measured across overlapping
five-year periods centered on acquisition years.  In order to be included in a five-year block, firms are
required to be present in all years represented by the block.  However, we do not require firms to be
present in all years of the sample period (1988-1995) in order to be included in the analysis.  Thus, the
firms included in the five-year blocks (1988-1992, 1989-1993, 1990-1994, and 1991-1995) differ
somewhat over time.  The target firms in our sample are included in the data set only for the five-year block
surrounding their acquisition; merged or acquired firms that were omitted from our sample based on our
selection criteria are excluded from this analysis. The same sample is used for both the Malmquist
regressions and the regressions where the ratios KE(t+2)/KE(t-2) are the dependent variables.
The regressions (see Table 4) reveal that the Malmquist indices of technical change and total factor
productivity change are significantly larger for target firms than for non M&A firms.  Because the
Malmquist index of technical change does not differ significantly between the two groups of firms, the
difference in total factor productivity change is due almost exclusively to technical efficiency change.  The
target company variable in the regression with the ratio TE(t+2)/TE(t-2) as the dependent variable is also
statistically significant, primarily due to pure technical efficiency gains rather than changes in scale
efficiency.  The regression results thus provide strong evidence that target firms experienced significantly
larger gains in technical efficiency than firms that were not involved in M&A activity.
The other regressions shown in Table 4 reveal that target firms also experienced significantly larger
gains in both cost and revenue efficiency than did non-M&A firms, with the cost efficiency gains 
attributable primarily to gains in technical rather than allocative efficiency. This provides further evidence
that acquisitions have had a beneficial effect on efficiency in the life insurance industry, and that the gains
affect revenues as well as costs.  The improvements in both revenue and cost efficiency suggest that
acquisitions may have a strong positive effect on profits for target firms.   
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transaction, while theirs is the difference in the firm’s post and pre-transaction efficiency rank, where the rank
is defined as the proportion of firms with efficiency scores lower than that of a given firm.  As a robustness
check, we also ran our regressions, using the change in efficiency rank as the dependent variable. The results
are essentially the same as those reported in Table 4 except that the target firm dummy variable is
insignificant in the revenue change regression.  Thus, some caution is in order in drawing conclusions about
the effects of acquisitions on revenue efficiency. 
Evidence that mutual property-liability insurers are involved in less complex and less risky
20
activities is provided by Mayers and Smith (1988) and Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993).  
The control variables in the regressions reveal that larger firms experienced significantly lower
efficiency changes than smaller firms.  Mutual firms achieved significantly lower efficiency growth than
stock firms, except for scale and revenue efficiency where there is no significant difference between stocks
and mutuals.  The technical and cost efficiency differences between stocks and mutuals could be consistent
with “expense preference” behavior on the part of mutuals (e.g., Mester, 1989) and/or could  provide
further evidence that mutuals operate in less complex and less risky lines of business that may provide
fewer opportunities for technological gains.   Geographically concentrated firms experienced smaller
20
changes in technical, cost, and revenue efficiency than geographically diversified firms.  The more
concentrated firms also experienced lower total factor productivity change, in spite of having somewhat
higher technical change than more diversified firms.  A possible explanation for this finding is that
technological advances in data transmission and communications may provide more opportunities for
improving efficiency for firms that are relatively diversified geographically. 
Firms with higher proportions of their premiums in group life insurance experienced significantly
lower growth in all types of efficiency except scale efficiency but experienced significantly more technical
change than firms that are less active in group life insurance.  This is consistent with the view that group life
insurance is a highly efficient line of business, because the opportunity for efficiency gains would be lower
in a relatively efficient line.   However, because the line is already highly efficient and competitive, firms
have a strong incentive to adopt new technology in order to remain viable and/or  gain competitive
advantages over their rivals.  Efficiency gains were also significantly lower in the accident and health line of26
We compared one rather than two years pre- and post-acquisition because the degrees of freedom
21
for a five-year window are even more limited.  
business, perhaps because this line is already relatively efficient due to the intensive pressure to control
costs in the health care industry.  
Analyzing the effects of acquisitions on acquiring firms proved to be more difficult than for target
firms. We have efficiency data for only 46 acquirers because some are not insurance companies and hence
do not appear in our database, and several acquirers engaged in more than one transaction during the
sample period.  In addition, since our database reports data by company, we lack consolidated statements
for insurance groups.  Nevertheless, we created efficiency scores for acquiring insurance organizations and
for non-M&A insurers at the group level, calculating group efficiency scores by taking weighted averages
of the efficiencies of the companies that were members of the group, with weights equal to total insurance
output. We looked at the three-year window extending from the year prior to an acquisition to the year after
the acquisition, matching non-M&A firms and acquirers by year.  
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There are no significant differences in efficiency between acquirers and non-M&A firms in the year
prior to an acquisition, although non-M&A firms had slightly higher efficiencies than acquirers. The
average efficiencies of both acquirers and non-M&A firms increased between the pre- and post-acquisition
years. With the exception of scale efficiency, the efficiency gains were larger for acquirers; and acquirer
efficiencies exceed those of non-M&A firms in the year following an acquisition, although only the
difference in pure technical efficiency is statistically significant.  Based on a regression analysis similar to
that shown in Table 4, acquirers experience significantly larger gains in cost efficiency than non-M&A
firms in the three year window surrounding the acquisition year.  Thus, we also find some evidence that
acquisitions have a beneficial effect on the efficiency of acquiring insurance groups.
Probit Analysis of the Probability of Acquisition
The probit analysis of the probability that a firm becomes an acquisition target is presented in Table
5.  The dependent variable in this analysis is equal to 1 for firms that were acquired and equal to zero for27
We conducted robustness checks by estimating models based on a sample that also included firms
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that were merged or retired following the transaction.  The results were not materially affected by pooling the
merged and acquired firms. The number of merged firms for which we have valid data (18 in total) is too
small to support any separate conclusions.  
non-M&A firms.  The independent variables in the regression are lagged one year so that firm
characteristics prior to the acquisition year are associated with what occurs during the acquisition year. 
Acquired firms are included in the probit analysis only in the year of their acquisition.  Targets of merger
activity or acquisition targets that were omitted from our sample based on other selection criteria are
eliminated from the data set entirely.   Non-M&A firms are included for all sample years (1989-1994).
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The probit models include several explanatory variables to test the hypotheses discussed in section
2 along with control variables.  To test the hypothesis that firms exhibiting increasing or constant returns to
scale are more attractive acquisition targets than firms exhibiting decreasing returns to scale, we include a
dummy variable set equal to 1 if the firm exhibits non-decreasing (increasing or constant) returns to scale
and to zero otherwise.  A positive coefficient on this variable would support the hypothesis.  To test the
hypothesis that efficient firms are attractive acquisition targets, we include efficiency ratios in the
regressions.  Because these ratios tend to be highly correlated, we include only one type of efficiency ratio
in each equation.  Positive coefficients on one or more of the efficiency variables would support our
hypothesis.
Several variables are included in the equations to test the hypothesis that financially vulnerable
firms are likely to be acquisition targets.  The ratio of equity capital to assets is used to measure the 
adequacy of the firm’s capitalization.  We also include the ratio of net operating cash flow to assets as a
measure of the adequacy of funds to invest in new projects, and the one-year growth rate in premiums to
measure growth opportunities.  As a liquidity ratio, we use the ratio of cash and invested assets to liabilities. 
We expect all of these variables to be inversely related to the probability of acquisition.
We include a dummy variable equal to 1 for unaffiliated single firms and zero otherwise to test the
hypothesis that managers of unaffiliated single firms are likely to resist buy-out offers to protect their job28
We also tested scale efficiency as an alternative to the NDRS dummy variable and as an additional
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variable to measure the effects of scale.  This variable was not statistically significant, and it did not affect the
significance of the NDRS variable when both were included in the equation.  This strengthens our argument
that acquiring firms tend to prefer targets operating with increasing or constant returns to scale.
security.  A negative coefficient on this variable would be consistent with the hypothesis.
As control variables, we include the log of assets to capture size effects; and a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm is a mutual and equal to zero otherwise.  Conventional wisdom would predict a
negative coefficient for the log of assets, and the mutual dummy is also expected to have a negative sign
because mutuals are more difficult to acquire than stocks.  The geographical Herfindahl index is included to
control for the degree of geographical diversification.  We do not have a strong prediction regarding the
sign of this variable.  It might make sense for firms seeking to expand into new markets to acquire firms
that specialize in particular states and regions because of their knowledge of the market.  On the other hand,
firms seeking earnings diversification may find it cost effective to acquire one or two firms whose
operations cover broader geographical areas rather than acquiring several single state firms, both in terms
of the fixed costs of an acquisition and the costs of post-acquisition integration.  Our final control variables
consist of business mix percentages and year dummies. 
The probit results (see Table 5) provide strong support for the hypothesis that firms exhibiting non-
decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) are more likely to be acquisition targets.  The non-decreasing returns to
scale dummy variable has a positive and significant coefficient in every equation.  We also find some
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support for the hypothesis that more efficient firms are attractive merger targets. All efficiency variables
with the exception of allocative efficiency are positively related to the probability of acquisition, although
only revenue efficiency is statistically significant.  This suggest that firms with relatively high  revenue
efficiency are especially attractive as acquisition targets. 
The results also support the hypothesis that financially vulnerable firms are more likely than
stronger firms to become acquisition targets.  The capital-to-asset ratio is statistically significant at the 5
percent level in all of the probit regressions, with the expected negative sign in all cases.  The ratio of net29
operating cash flow to liabilities is significant at the 5 percent level or better in all models, also with the
expected negative sign.  The premium growth variable also has the expected negative sign but is not
statistically significant.  The only financial strength variable that has an unexpected sign is the ratio of liquid
assets to reserves, which is positively related to the probability of acquisition, although not statistically
significant. A possible explanation for this result is that the liquidity ratio may proxy both for financial
vulnerability (suggesting a negative coefficient) and for the attractiveness of the firms as an acquisition
target (suggesting a positive coefficient). That is, controlling for capitalization and cash flow,  the acquiring
firm is better off with liquid assets than with  assets such as receivables from agents and reinsurers, and this
effect offsets the role of this variable as an indicator of financial vulnerability.
The unaffiliated single firm dummy variable has a negative coefficient as expected and is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level or better in all of the probit models. This provides strong
support for the hypothesis that managers of unaffiliated single firms have an incentive to resist takeovers.
As expected, the equations provide evidence that mutuals are less likely to be acquired than stocks. 
Geographically diversified firms are more likely to be acquired than firms operating more narrowly,
consistent with the earnings diversification/costs of acquisition hypothesis.  The log of assets is inversely
related to acquisition probability, supporting the view that acquisition targets tend to be relatively small.  . 7.  Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between acquisitions and efficiency in the US life insurance
industry.  We estimate efficiency for life insurers representing 80 percent of industry assets over the period
1988-1995 using data envelopment analysis (DEA).  Malmquist indices are used to measure technical
efficiency change, technical change, and total factor productivity change over time.
We investigate five principal hypotheses: (1) that acquisitions lead to improvements in efficiency
for the acquired firm; (2) that firms operating with non-decreasing returns to scale are more attractive 
acquisition targets than firms operating with decreasing returns to scale; (3) that efficient firms are more
likely to be acquired than inefficient ones; (4) that financially vulnerable firms are more likely to be30
acquired; and (5) that unaffiliated single insurers are less likely to be acquired than members of groups.
To test the hypothesis that acquisitions lead to improvements in efficiency, we regress the change in
efficiency two-years after acquisition vs. two-years prior to acquisition on a dummy variable set equal to 1
for acquisition targets and to zero for non-M&A firms as well as a set of control variables.  The results
provide strong evidence that acquired firms achieve greater gains in technical, cost, and revenue efficiency
than non-M&A firms, suggesting that the recent restructuring of the life insurance industry has produced
significant efficiency gains and improved profitability for target firms. 
Probit models are used to investigate hypotheses (2) through (5).  We provide support for the
hypothesis that firms characterized by non-decreasing returns to scale are significantly more likely to
become acquisition targets than firms operating with decreasing returns to scale.  This suggests that insurers
have generally acted rationally by avoiding acquisitions of firms that are already too large. We also provide
evidence that financially vulnerable insurers are more likely to be acquired than financially stronger firms. 
Thus, regulation also appears to have driven consolidation among life insurers.  Although  firm efficiency is
generally positively related to the probability of acquisition, this relationship is statistically significant only
for revenue efficiency.  Thus, acquiring firms may consider a target’s success in the product market to be
more important than cost or technical efficiency, perhaps because making internal improvements is easier
than replicating a competitive advantage in generating revenue.
The overall conclusion is that mergers and acquisitions in the life insurance industry appear to be
driven for the most part by economically viable objectives and have had a beneficial effect on efficiency in
the industry.  We expect to see more consolidation in the industry in the future because many insurers  are
burdened with costly agency distribution systems that in the long-run will lose out to non-traditional
competitors.  Glass-Steagall repeal also would lead more mergers and acquisitions, and the competitive
landscape would change even more profoundly if the Federal income tax code were revised to reduce the
tax deferral on interest earnings accumulated in life insurance and annuity contracts.  Finally, many firms in
the industry still have not been able to use technology effectively to create value for shareholders and31
policyholders, providing a further motivation for consolidation. References
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d e fTable 1
US Life Insurance Industry: Number of Firms
Year  Groups Companies Companies Companies DMUs
Affiliated Unaffiliated
88 379 891 334 1,225 713
89 379 907 337 1,244 716
90 379 916 341 1,257 720
91 381 941 363 1,304 744
92 381 936 352 1,288 733
93 369 902 339 1,241 708
94 357 899 334 1,233 691
95 341 884 303 1,187 644
Table 2 
Concentration Ratios for the U.S. Life Insurance Industry
Assets Total Premiums
Year 4-Firm 8-Firm 20-Firm 4-Firm 8-Firm 20-Firm
88 27.4% 39.4% 56.5% 21.0% 29.8% 45.0%
89 26.2% 37.9% 55.2% 22.2% 31.1% 46.6%
90 24.7% 36.4% 53.9% 23.8% 32.6% 49.4%
91 24.4% 35.7% 53.9% 23.1% 33.0% 50.1%
92 23.6% 34.4% 52.9% 22.4% 31.7% 48.7%
93 22.8% 33.3% 51.9% 20.6% 29.7% 47.5%
94 21.9% 31.8% 50.9% 19.9% 29.1% 46.1%
95 21.4% 31.4% 51.1% 19.6% 29.0% 45.7%Table 3
Summary Statistics on Target and Non-M&A Firms
1989-1994 Averages
Target Firms Non M&A Firms
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Company Characteristics:
Total assets (millions) $1,876.14 $203.21 * $1,904.65 $206.84
Capital/Total assets 0.203 0.182 0.213 0.170
Liquidity ratio 1.606 2.380 1.348 1.451
Operating cash flow/Total assets 0.029 0.210 *** 0.087 0.137
Invested assets/Total assets 0.940 0.060 0.940 0.068
Percent of invested assets in real estate 1.7% 3.0% 1.7% 3.2%
Percent of invested assets in stocks 4.3% 6.2% *** 6.4% 9.4%
Percent of invested assets in bonds 72.3% 20.1% * 68.9% 20.1%
Percent of invested assets in mortgages 6.7% 9.6% ** 8.7% 11.7%
Total premiums (millions) $238.55 $762.52 * $361.74 $1,468.28
Percent change in premiums, t-1 to t 104.9% 89.6% * 117.3% 93.3%
Percent of premiums in group life 9.9% 18.6% 11.0% 20.7%
Percent of premiums in group annuities 4.5% 15.6% 4.8% 13.8%
Percent of premiums in accident/health 26.5% 32.6% 29.0% 35.6%
Percent of premiums in indiv. annuities 20.2% 31.0% 17.4% 26.9%
Percent of cos with non-decr. rets to scale 73.3% 44.5% *** 60.3% 48.9%
Geographic Herfindahl, premiums 2890.76 3065.9 ** 3551.32 3364.62
Percent unaffiliated companies 14.0% 34.9% *** 25.1% 43.4%
Percent mutual companies 2.3% 15.2% *** 13.6% 34.3%
Percent companies with A+ rating 15.1% 36.0% *** 29.8% 45.7%
Percent companies with A or A- rating 38.4% 48.9% * 29.9% 45.8%
Percent companies with B+ or B rating 18.6% 39.1% 18.0% 38.5%
Efficiency Scores:
Cost efficiency 0.3890 0.2520 0.3569 0.2198
Technical efficiency 0.6310 0.2950 ** 0.5680 0.2865
Allocative efficiency 0.6266 0.2280 0.6415 0.2141
Pure technical efficiency 0.6809 0.2861 ** 0.6324 0.2702
Scale Efficiency 0.9267 0.1424 ** 0.8944 0.1483
Revenue Efficiency 0.3765 0.3155 0.3357 0.2705
Malmquist Index:
Technical Efficiency Change 2.7250 4.1765 ** 1.2728 0.8816
Technical Change 0.9606 0.4240 0.9625 0.3586
Total Factor Productivity Change 2.0450 3.3344 ** 1.1594 0.9106
Note:  Variable values are for one year prior to transaction.  Percent change in premiums, t-1 to t is 
defined as premiums,t divided by premiums, t-1.
***Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent levelTable 4
Regression Models of Changes in Efficiency
Malmquist Indices Efficiency Two Years After/Two Years Before Acquistion
Variable Change Chg Change CE TE AE PTE SE RE
TE Tech. TFP
Intercept 3.7256 *** 0.7736 *** 3.1859 *** 3.2757 *** 3.6868 *** 1.1701 *** 3.3447 *** 1.1955 ***     5.5823 ***
0.3868 0.1107 0.3548 0.2737 0.2582 0.1590 0.2188 0.0923 0.7132
Target Company Dummy 0.7154 *** 0.0295 0.6990 *** 0.4422 *** 0.3811 *** 0.0226 0.3279 *** 0.0145 0.8673 ***
0.1620 0.0463 0.1486 0.1152 0.1086 0.0669 0.0920 0.0388 0.2995
Ln(Assets) -0.0884 *** -0.0025 -0.0894 *** -0.0842 *** -0.1080 *** -0.0005 -0.0956 *** -0.0058 -0.1727 ***
0.0191 0.0055 0.0175 0.0135 0.0128 0.0079 0.0108 0.0046 0.0352
Mutual -0.1253 * -0.0337 * -0.1387 ** -0.1341 *** -0.0873 * -0.0753 ** -0.0857 ** 0.0026 0.0185
0.0696 0.0199 0.0639 0.0517 0.0488 0.0300 0.0413 0.0174 0.1345
Geographic Herfindahl (<0) -0.4368 *** 0.0875 *** -0.2933 *** -0.2829 *** -0.4007 *** 0.0131 -0.3791 *** -0.0001 -0.6734 ***
0.0916 0.0262 0.0841 0.0663 0.0626 0.0385 0.0530 0.9224 0.1728
Unaffiliated Company 0.0144 -0.0430 ** -0.0767 -0.0872 * -0.0642 -0.0303 -0.0674 * 0.0134 -0.1466
0.0654 0.0187 0.0600 0.0473 0.0446 0.0275 0.0378 0.0159 0.1233
Pct Group Life Premiums -0.9877 *** 0.5170 *** -0.3179 ** -0.5033 *** -0.4004 *** -0.1948 *** -0.4813 *** 0.0433 -0.6748 **
0.1786 0.0511 0.1639 0.1314 0.1239 0.0763 0.1050 0.0443 0.3419
Pct Group Annuity -0.3994 ** -0.1091 * -0.2919 -0.1633 -0.1369 0.0302 -0.1257 0.0149 -0.5965 *
0.2064 0.0591 0.1894 0.1390 0.1311 0.0807 0.1111 0.0468 0.3617
Pct Indiv.l Annuity Premiums -0.3907 *** 0.0442 -0.2672 ** -0.0162 0.1077 -0.0986 ** 0.1018 -0.0103 0.2419
0.1192 0.0341 0.1093 0.0860 0.0812 0.0500 0.0688 0.0290 0.2240
Pct Acc&Health Premiums -0.3965 *** -0.0744 *** -0.3291 *** -0.5795 *** -0.4751 *** -0.0997 *** -0.3920 *** -0.0476 ** -0.6576 ***
0.0842 0.0241 0.0772 0.0615 0.0581 0.0357 0.0492 0.0207 0.1605
1991 Dummy -0.4725 *** 0.3072 *** 0.0043 -0.1358 *** 0.1375 *** -0.1944 *** 0.0635 0.0614 *** -0.2348 *
0.0698 0.0120 0.0641 0.0511 0.0482 0.0297 0.0408 0.0172 0.1330
1992 Dummy -0.2531 *** 0.1432 *** 0.0037 0.2417 *** -0.0441 0.1950 *** 0.0144 -0.0388 *** 0.5803 ***
0.0701 0.0200 0.0643 0.0514 0.0485 0.0299 0.0411 0.0173 0.1342
1993 Dummy -0.6105 *** 0.4073 *** -0.0240 0.1739 *** 0.1782 *** -0.0272 0.1728 *** -0.0187 -0.7014 ***
0.0706 0.0202 0.0648 0.0512 0.0483 0.0298 0.0410 0.0173 0.1335
0.1097 0.2740 0.0507 0.1104 0.1040 0.0923 0.1086 0.0213 0.0785
2     Adjusted R
No. of obs. 1688 1688 1688 1798 1798 1798 1798 1798 1792
Note:  TE Change,  and Technical Change are components of the Malmquist Index of TFP.  The dependent variable in the remaining equations is  KE(t)= efficiency of
type K in year t. K=C=cost efficiency; K=A=allocative efficiency; K=T=technical efficiency; K=PT=pure technical efficiency; K=S=scale efficiency; and
K=R=revenue efficiency.  Standard Errors are presented below the estimated coefficients. 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.Table 5
Probit Models of the Probability of Acquisition in Year t
 
Efficiency Variable
CE TE PTE AE RE
Intercept 0.7738 0.5690 0.5786 0.4786 0.9821
0.9690 0.9403 0.9363 0.9418 0.9532
Non-decreasing rts dummy 0.2456 * 0.2541 ** 0.2722 ** 0.2727 ** 0.2290 * t-1
0.1317 0.1304 0.1300 0.1305 0.1309
Efficiency 0.3092 0.2277   0.3073 -0.0399 0.4836 ** t-1
0.2708 0.1985 0.1959 0.2472 0.1999
Pct Change in Premiums(t/(t-1)) -0.1134 -0.1102 -0.1116 -0.1162 -0.1068
0.0724 0.0722 0.0725 0.0731 0.0709
 
Net Cash Flow /Assets -0.9080 ** -0.8977 *** -0.8799 *** -0.9319 *** -0.9376 *** t-1 t-1
0.2189 0.2186 0.2198 0.2182 0.2171
Capital /Assets -0.9026 ** -0.8837 ** -0.8881 ** -0.9380 ** -0.8673 ** t-1 t-1
0.4127 0.4083 0.4067 0.4096 0.4081
 
Liquidity Ratio 0.0376   0.0375   0.0374   0.0373   0.0356   t-1
0.0242 0.0240 0.0240 0.0241 0.0244
Ln(Assets ) -0.1288 *** -0.1217 *** -0.1253 *** -0.1104 ** -0.1434 *** t-1
0.0474 0.0455 0.0453 0.0457 0.0462
Mutual Dummy -0.7205 *** -0.7123 *** -0.7162 *** -0.7017 *** -0.6868 ***
0.2692 0.2679 0.2680 0.2666 0.2705
Geographic Herfindahl -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** t-1
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unaffiliated Company Dummy -0.3783 *** -0.3827 *** -0.3951 *** -0.3877 *** -0.3907 ***
0.1408 0.1406 0.1413 0.1408 0.1418
% Group Life Premiums -0.0539   -0.0271   -0.0429   0.0251   0.0307   t-1
0.2829 0.2769 0.2764 0.2673 0.2740
 
% Group Annuity Premiums 0.3620   0.3510   0.3243   0.4239   0.2746   t-1
0.3905 0.3911 0.3911 0.3855 0.3912
%Indiv Annuity Premiums 0.2627   0.2621   0.2573   0.2895   0.2492   t-1
0.2126 0.2126 0.2119 0.2103 0.2105
Pct Acc&Health Premiums -0.1017 -0.1195 -0.1228 -0.0996 -0.1864 t-1
0.1634 0.1657 0.1647 0.1634 0.1708
 
Log-Likelihood -364.19 -364.17 -363.60 -364.81 -361.75
Note: Standard errors are presented below the estimated coefficients. *** Significant at 1%  level;
**significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 1% level.